[Privacy] PRIVACY.md implies an image gets the same projection treatment as text #628
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LibreKAT/Ocideck#628
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Found in the pre-publication privacy review. The code here is better than the text, which is the reason to fix it.
Evidence:
docs/PRIVACY.md:266-270— the AI helper sends "only what the task needs: one image for alt-text, or the single finding you are editing … And that text context does not leave as you typed it: it is first run through the same privacy projection every other outbound path uses."The code says something different, and better:
lib/widgets/editors/alt_text_field.dart:111-116— "Een afbeelding kan niet door de projectie … Zonder dit stuurde één klik een schermafdruk van een beheerpaneel of een groepsfoto naar een derde partij." There is a real safeguard —confirmAiImageOutboundat:118, including a face count — that does not appear in PRIVACY.md at all.Why this matters now: the paragraph names image and text in one breath and applies the safeguard only to text, so a reader infers the image is equally protected. For a penetration tester the evidence screenshot is the most sensitive thing there is. The per-image confirmation is a selling point going unmentioned.
Proposal: two sentences in the same paragraph: an image cannot pass through the projection (which substitutes characters, and a JPEG has none), and that is why OciDeck asks for confirmation per image, naming the destination and the number of recognisable faces.